






SEPARATE, EqUAL, OR  
SEPARATE ‑BUT ‑EqUAL? 
THE CHANGING IMAGE OF RACE IN 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS
There is no doubt that the United States were not created as a purely demo-
cratic state. On the one hand, it established basic rules and principles of demo-
cratic government such as free elections, sovereignty of the nation, fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals or independent judiciary. All of these prin-
ciples were, however, enjoyed only by the part of American society: free elec-
tions were guaranteed for white men, excluding women and blacks; sovereign-
ty belonged to the nation, i.e. white women and men, because slaves were not 
considered citizens; fundamental rights and freedoms were guaranteed only for 
whites; institutional independence of the judicial branch did not prevent the 
system from injustice towards the blacks. Furthermore, one of the most impor-
tant values of democratic society, equal protection of law, was absent in the origi-
nal constitutional document of 1787, as well as the provisions of Bill of Rights. 
The clause became part of U.S. constitutional reality yet in 1868 when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, as a direct result of social and political 
changes caused by the civil war. After introducing the Thirteenth Amendment 
in 1865, which abolished slavery, the government took a step forward by making 
all citizens equal in 1868 and by providing black Americans with suffrage rights 
in 1870. For former slaves it meant a milestone step in their fight to destroy the 
social and political boundaries which limited their basic rights and freedoms. 
However, before the above mentioned events took place, the period of injustice 
and exploitation occurred with the U.S. Supreme Court in the middle of social 
and political tensions. The main purpose of the article is to show the changing 
attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the social and political status 
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of African -Americans. This attitude influenced historical and contemporary so-
cial relations among the American society proving one of the most controversial 
aspects of U.S. democracy.
U.S. Supreme Court, judicial review, racial segregation, equal protection of law, 
constitutionalism
INTRODUCTION
When one wonders about the true spirit of America, envisioned often in the 220 -years-
-old words of the Founding Fathers, or in the later -created myth of so -called “American 
Dream”, it is difficult to imagine that the terms “democracy”, “rule of law” or “equal jus-
tice to all” were used very often to justify… inequality. There is no doubt that the United 
States of America were not created as a fully democratic state. On one hand it established 
constitutional rules and principles of democratic government such as free elections, sov-
ereignty of the nation, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals or independent 
judiciary. All of these principles were, however, enjoyed by only part of American soci-
ety: free elections were guaranteed for white men, not including women and African-
-Americans; sovereignty belonged to the nation, i.e. white women and men, because 
slaves were not considered citizens; fundamental rights and freedoms were guaranteed 
only by the federal government and were not enjoyed by slaves; and institutional in-
dependence of the judicial branch did not prevent the system from injustice towards 
African -Americans. Furthermore, one of the most important values of democratic so-
ciety, the equal protection of law, was absent in the original constitutional document 
of 1787, and in the provisions of the Bill of Rights, fundamental guarantees of the free 
society. The phrase “equal protection of law” became part of the U.S. constitutional re-
ality in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted as a direct result of social 
and political changes caused by the civil war. After introducing in 1865 the Thirteenth 
Amendment which abolished slavery, the government took a step forward by equalizing 
all of the citizens before law in 1868 and by providing African -Americans with suffrage 
rights in 1870. For former slaves it meant a milestone step in their fight to destroy the 
social and political boundaries which limited their basic rights and freedoms.
However, before the above mentioned events, the period of injustice and exploita-
tion occurred with the U.S. Supreme Court in the middle of social and political ten-
sions. It is important to acknowledge that thanks to its unique ability to check the con-
stitutionality of federal and state laws, the Court became the main actor responsible for 
interpretation of particular terms, phrases, clauses and provisions of the U.S. constitu-
tion1. Thus also in cases concerning the legal status of racial minorities, their social po-
1 The power of judicial review was adopted by the Court itself in Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 
(1803).
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sition, scope of their rights and freedoms, as well as the issue of slavery in general, the 
Justices of the Court had their final say, which was binding and shaped the direction of 
U.S. politics towards Negroes/African -Americans. For example, a few years before the 
civil war, the Court adjudicated in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which it determined that 
slavery could be indirectly derived from the Constitution thus throwing a rock into the 
stream of racial tensions between the North and the South of the country. It was not, 
however, the last controversial decision of the highest judicial tribunal referring to so-
cial relations and social position of black Americans. In 1896 a case Plessy v. Fergusson 
was decided, and despite the existence of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Justices affirmed constitutionally -based segregation by creating the 
so -called “separate but equal” doctrine. As a result, for more than fifty years, public 
places such as schools, offices, libraries or means of transportation had been divided 
into areas for the white and black citizens. The two above -mentioned examples are just 
the tip of the iceberg, as throughout its history the Supreme Court very often confront-
ed the controversial issues of racial relations within the U.S. society.
The main purpose of the article is to show the changing attitude of the Supreme 
Court Justices with regard to the social and political status of Negroes/African-
-Americans. Apart from analysis of the two milestone cases, Dred Scott and Plessy, it is 
worth observing how in numerous decisions the Court interpreted the scope of equal 
protection of law clause, influencing everyday life of millions of American citizens, who 
longed for more than 150 years for formal freedom from any kind of discrimination. 
The analysis shall prove that the Court’s attitude towards Negroes/African -Americans 
influenced historical and contemporary social relations among the American society 
becoming probably the most controversial aspect of U.S. democracy in its history2.
SLAvERY AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE STATE
Before addressing the controversies set out by the adjudication of the Supreme Court, 
one should definitely observe, that since the very beginning of American statehood 
the problem of racism and slavery had been present. Even during colonial times, ships 
full of slaves landed at the East Coast of the continent, spreading about five hundred 
thousand of cheap labor force to various British colonies. As Peter Irons observes, the 
importation of Africans into colonies began around 1620, and all of the colonies (both 
Northern and Southern) accepted the institution of slavery creating soon so -called 
2 It is worth observing, that all of the cases analyzed in this paper concern the constitutional status of 
African -Americans in U.S. history, but every researcher would easily point out lack of decisions regard-
ing other racial minorities, such as Latin -Americans or Japanese -Americans. There were of  course land-
mark cases concerning the equal protection of the mentioned social groups, some of which were highly 
controversial (Hirabayashi v. United States (320 U.S. 81, 1943), korematsu v. United States (323 U.S. 
214, 1944), Hernandez v. Texas (347 U.S. 475, 1954)), but the main purpose of my research was to 
show the changing attitude of the Supreme Court towards African -Americans, as it dominated in the 
Court’s docket over other issues.
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“black codes” designed on one hand to confirm servile status of Africans, and on the 
other to protect their owners from any form of slaves’ insubordination3. By the year 
1700 slaves made only 5% of total population of the colonies, but during the 18th cen-
tury their number increased rapidly and before the American Revolution they made 
at least one fifth of the population of many colonies, while in Virginia and Maryland 
almost one third of the inhabitants had African origins4. Apart from officially legaliz-
ing slavery, many colonies established drastic rules concerning the status of the colored 
people: in Virginia, the courts declared that children born to a slave mother automati-
cally became slaves5. Therefore, it was already established practice in the 17th and 18th 
century, that all of the important political positions in colonies, as well as all benefits 
stemming from various legal guarantees of equality, related to white men, leaving black 
slaves with a different taste of justice. How in this light should one interpret the words 
of the famous Declaration of Independence guaranteeing equality to every person? The 
document, which laid in 1776 the foundations for the existence of a new nation and 
state, referred to many values and rights of the people, but – similarly to the federal 
constitution of 1787 – it did not abolish the institution of slavery, rooted since then on 
American soil for many decades.
First effort to limit slavery came from the Continental Congress, the body of del-
egates of the colonies, which, acting upon Articles of Confederation of 1777, banned 
slavery in the federal territory. According to Anthony Iaccarino, although many of the 
Founding Fathers acknowledged that slavery violated the core American revolution-
ary ideal of liberty, their simultaneous commitment to private property rights, princi-
ples of limited government, and intersectional harmony prevented them from making 
a bold move against slavery6. Therefore, the decision of the Continental Congress did 
not influence the legal status of black people in all thirteen colonies, where slavery was 
untouched, as well as it was not followed by the constitutional document of 1787, 
which indirectly authorized the trade of the Africans in the United States of America. 
During the Constitutional Convention held in Philadelphia, most of the delegates 
were not willing to address the problem of slavery, as they were owners of slaves them-
selves, but it did not mean that all of the Founding Fathers were proponents of the 
slave trade. Benjamin Franklin, for example, very often stated his reluctance to the 
brutal treatment of the Africans, not only in the British colonies but also other places 
of the world where they were used as cheap labor force: Can the sweetening our tea with 
sugar be a circumstance of such absolute necessity? Can the petty pleasure thence arising 
to the taste compensate for so much misery produced among our fellow creatures, and such 
a constant butchery of the human species by this pestilential detestable traffic in the bodies 
3 P. Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court. New York 2000, pp. 13 -14.
4 P. Jenkins, A History of the United States, New York 2007, p. 13.
5 L.R. Monk, The Words We Live By. Your Annotated Guide to the Constitution, New York 2000, 
p. 206.
6 A. Iaccarino, ‘The Founding Fathers and Slavery’ in The Founding Fathers. The Essential Guide to the 
Men Who Made America, Hoboken 2007, pp. 66 -67.
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and souls of men?7 Regardless of individual opinions, the majority of delegates opted 
for upholding the unequal status of Africans in the new country, what was envisioned 
in the constitution of 1787.
Firstly, by declaring the sovereignty of the nation in the Preamble, the Founding 
Fathers gave the right to vote to white property -owners, thus excluding women, men 
without property, and of course slaves. Secondly, for purposes of estimating the number 
of representatives chosen by particular states to the House of Representatives, the 
Constitution allowed to count slaves as three -fifths of a person, which was a compro-
mise between the delegates supporting and neglecting slavery8. As a result, five slaves 
were counted as three people, and states owning more black persons could benefit by 
having larger representation in the lower chamber of Congress. In the same part of 
the document, the federal Congress was prohibited to end the trade of slaves before 
the year 1808, what generally meant legally -established termination of importing the 
foreign slaves, but in reality it did not stop the procedure of slave trade within the bor-
ders of the United States9. At a first glance, it might seem obvious that the content 
of these provisions was a result of necessary compromise between the southern and 
northern delegates to the Constitutional Convention, but according to Akhil Amar, 
there were many clauses in the document which actually strengthened slavery. Not only 
Article One did confirm the unequal status of Negroes, but also Article Two handed 
slave states extra seats in the Electoral College, the presidents could in turn nominate 
proslavery judges based on Article Three, and Article Four obliged free states to send 
fugitive slaves back to slavery10. In sum, the federal constitution could be regarded as 
a document promoting neither slavery, nor equality. But facts are obvious: by not abol-
ishing the unequal status of black members of the society, after 167 years from the ar-
rival of first slaves to America, the constitution set the scope of social and political re-
lations within the new country. Time was to prove, that the country needed the next 
167 years of inequality in order to reshape these social and political relations. The main 
actor in this respect became the U.S. Supreme Court which has begun the process of 
constitutional interpretation since the beginning of the 19th century.
INTO THE DIRECTION OF WAR
It is the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is11 – these words 
stated by Chief Justice John Marshall seem crucial for the understanding of the role of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in American legal and political system. Justice Marshall and his 
Court provided a basis for the exercise of judicial review, i.e. the power of the judicial 
7 L.R. Monk, The Words We Live By…, p. 57.
8 Article One, Section 2, Clause 3.
9 Article One, Section 9, Clause 1.
10 A.R. Amar, America’s Constitution. A Biography, New York 2005, pp. 20 -21.
11 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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department to declare acts of other branches of government null and void, in the case 
of their inconsistency with the federal Constitution. What it really meant, however, 
was the beginning of judicial interpretation of the Constitution, which has been now 
exercised for more than 200 years, making judges the most powerful and influential ac-
tors in the U.S. political and legal scene12. This case influenced not only the scope of 
American constitutional law, but it also allowed the courts to control other branches of 
government, changing the primary meaning of the checks and balances system. The ju-
diciary was to become stronger and very often superior to the executive and legislative 
branches of government, gaining more power than the Framers had agreed to grant it 
during the Constitutional Convention13. Despite the fact, that the law was created by 
other institutions in the legislative process, either on federal or state level, when the law 
allegedly violated someone’s rights, the case could be taken to the courts and thanks to 
the appealing procedure could even reach the highest judicial instance. Indeed, statisti-
cally only 5% of cases that every year reach the U.S. Supreme Court are granted hearing 
by the Justices, but if the dispute touches upon an important legal or social issue, then 
the Justices are willing to make their decision without hesitation. The analysis of the 
history of Court’s adjudication proves that the racial issues have become a vital subject 
for the highest judicial instance in the United States, at least in crucial moments of 
American statehood.
Since 1803, when the Court gained the power of judicial review and was able to in-
terpret the Constitution, the issues of slavery and social status of Negroes had not been 
put on the docket to often until the mid -century. There were, however, cases which 
showed the attitude of the early Justices towards these issues, i.e. Prigg v. Pensylvania 
and Jones v. VanZandt14. The Prigg case, despite its reference to the problem of slavery, 
concerned the division of powers between the federal government and the states. It 
confronted the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s law which prohibited moving black 
people out of the state’s territory in order to enslave them. A slaveholder named Edward 
Prigg argued that the state law violated the U.S. constitution’s provisions concerning ex-
tradition of slaves among states. The Supreme Court confirmed Prigg’s argumentation 
declaring the unconstitutionality of Pensylvania’s law, and stating that it was the power 
of the federal government to enforce any slave laws established by the states15. Despite 
the fact, that the decision did not directly address the problem of slavery, the lack of the 
Court’s opinion in this matter meant silent support of slavery by the majority of the 
Justices. The second dispute concerned the legal status of nine slaves who escaped from 
12 There have been many books concerning the real position of the U.S. Supreme Court in American po-
litical system. The newer, valuable titles are: M. Tushnet, Taking Constitutional Away From the Courts, 
Princeton 2000; K.W. Starr, First Among Equals. The Supreme Court in American Life, New York 2002; 
K.E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy. The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and 
Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History, Princeton 2007; S. Kautz et al. (eds.), The Supreme Court 
and the Idea of Constitutionalism, Philadelphia 2009.
13 P. Laidler, Basic Cases in U.S. Constitutional Law, vol. 1: Separation of Powers, Cracow 2005, p. 15.
14 41 U.S. 539 (1842) and 46 U.S. 215 (1847).
15 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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their owners in the direction of the free territory and were given help by VanZandt. 
Before reaching the ‘promise land’ they all were caught by slaveholders what led to a lat-
er accusation of VanZandt, as his behavior violated then -existing Fugitive Slave Act16. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court in 1847, the Justices had to decide about 
the constitutionality of the Act, what would also show their attitude towards slavery. 
The Court admitted that the Fugitive Slave Act was consistent with the Constitution 
and it was the power of the states to decide about the status of slavery on their terri-
tory17. Both disputes may serve as an appetizer to the main decision made by the Court 
ten years later, but even individual analysis of Justices’ opinions in Prigg and VanZandt 
affirms then -used methodology of constitutional interpretation, called often the origi-
nalist approach18. The Supreme Court consisted of people who maybe did not openly 
support slavery, but at the same time read the constitutional document with regard to 
its original meaning set by the Founding Fathers. And because the original attitude of 
the document towards slavery was clear, there was no vivid discussion among the mem-
bers of the highest judicial instance in the United States about the scope of the rights 
of Negroes. There is no doubt that such an approach was consistent with the general 
direction of U.S. policy, as there were first signs of insubordination of Southern states 
for which the issue of slavery was vital and unchangeable19. However, social and politi-
cal reaction to Court’s adjudication in slavery matters was yet to become significant for 
U.S. history, and everything went down to one controversial decision of 1857.
Many prominent scholars have analyzed the Dred Scott decision thoroughly. There 
is no dispute to its direct and indirect effects, which finally led to the worst interior 
conflict America has ever had. But it would be an exaggeration to state that the civil war 
broke out because of the Supreme Court’s decision. Tensed social relations between the 
North and the South, different approach to slavery and growing economic disparities 
are the most common arguments used to explain the reasons of the conflict. On the 
other hand, the 1857 opinion of the Court inscribes into social and political tensions 
of those days. The dispute concerned a slave from Missouri, Dred Scott, who had been 
living for almost ten years in states and territories where slavery was prohibited. After 
some time he decided to sue his master, Sandford20, in order to gain freedom, claiming 
that his residing in free territories made him a free man. The majority opinion written 
by Chief Justice Roger Taney determined the legal situation of Dred Scott, consider-
ing him as a slave because of lack of citizenship. Furthermore, the Court negated the 
possibility of slaves becoming U.S. citizens in future, thus shocking the inhabitants of 
16 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
17 46 U.S. 215 (1847).
18 Theory of originalism is analyzed by Professor Vicki C. Jackson in her new book Constitutional 
Engagement in Transnational Era (New York 2010, pp. 20 -22).
19 Since 1814 the problem of nullification became present in U.S. political reality, but it was used for the 
first time in 1832 by South Carolina. Nullification meant the right to nullify any federal law by the 
state, but from the perspective of the supremacy of federal law it was unconstitutional. The problem 
became a sharp division between the states just before the civil war.
20 In reality his name was Sanford, but his name was misspelled in official records.
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the North. Basing their opinion on an interpretation of Articles Three and Four, the 
Justices acknowledged that never in American history had a slave become a citizen, and 
so the tradition must be upheld21. The outcomes of the case were highly controversial: 
slaves were not only deprived of U.S. citizenship but also of any chance of gaining it in 
future; federal territories were not able to end slavery anymore, as only states had such 
rights; and, by calling Negroes “beings of an inferior order” the Court deepened racial 
disparities in the whole country.
List of the critics of the Dred Scott decision is very long, and it is even impossible 
to try to write it down. Some call Justice Taney’s opinion the worst judicial ruling in 
American constitutional history22, but there are others moving the responsibility to the 
Founding Fathers regarding them as racists who sympathized with slavery23. Some de-
clare the Chief Justice the worst evil that could happen in U.S. judicial history predict-
ing, that the name of Taney is to be hooted down the page of history24. Others insist on ana-
lyzing the Dred Scott case from a wider perspective, as it did not exist in isolation to the 
direction into which the whole country went at this time25. However, all agree, that the 
1857 opinion established legal and political consent so as to the status of Negroes leav-
ing them without any guarantees of personal or property rights. Linda Monk goes even 
further in her suggestions, saying that the Dred Scott decision nationalized slavery by al-
lowing slaveholders to bring slaves into any part of Union26. No matter how controversial 
the decision tends to be, it is worth observing, that since the Marbury ruling, the 1857 
precedent was the first to declare a congressional act unconstitutional, therefore Chief 
Justice Taney used the earlier established institution of judicial review to reach a verdict 
sanctioning inequality and racism. The interpretation of the Constitution was based in 
general on the originalist approach, and it referred to the most undemocratic principles 
that had ever existed in the U.S. constitutional doctrine. Despite the fact, that the major-
ity of Justices confirmed Chief Justice’s vision, one should notice that there were dissent-
ing opinions in the Dred Scott case, written by the Justices McLean and Curtis.
Especially the opinion of Benjamin R. Curtis is worth analyzing, as it proves that 
there was no unanimity on the Court and some Justices opposed slavery in the pro-
posed form finding the reasoning of Roger Taney unconstitutional. In his dissent, 
21 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
22 C.L. Eisgruber, ‘The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism’s Forgotten Past’ in M.C. Dorf (ed.), Consti-
tutional Law Stories, New York 2004, p. 151.
23 H.J. Storing, ‘Slavery and the Moral Foundations of the American Republic’ in R.H. Horwitz (ed.), 
The Moral Foundations of the American Republic, Charlottesville 1986, p. 313.
24 Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts cited in: P. Finkelman, ‘The Taney Court (1836 -1864). The 
Jurisprudence of Slavery and the Crisis of the Union’ in C. Tomlins (ed.), The United States Supreme 
Court. The Pursuit of Justice, Boston 2005, p. 76.
25 For the thorough analysis of the Dred Scott legacy see: C.B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836 -1864, 
New York 1974 (vol. 5 of O.W. Holmes’ History of the Supreme Court of the United States); or in: 
D.E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case. Its Significance in American Law and Politics, New York 
1978.
26 L.R. Monk, The Words We Live By…, p. 207.
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Justice Curtis pointed out that the Constitution never used the word slavery, and 
while referring to African -Americans it always used the term “persons” (in contrary 
to the majority’s argument). He stressed, that slavery, being contrary to natural right, 
is created only by municipal law. This is not only plain in itself and agreed by all writers 
on this subject, but is inferable from the Constitution, and has been explicitly declared 
by this Court27. Although such statement did not suggest abolishing slavery, it led to 
conclusion, that slavery differed from other property rights and could not been sub-
ject to constitutional due process clause. The reference to natural rights seems today 
obvious, but was rarely used by any judge at that time, so Justice Curtis’ argument 
sounds unique among other members of the Court. It may lead to an assumption that 
Chief Justice’s reasoning could be based on different arguments and should not have 
gone as far as it had. Looking from theoretical perspective, one would consider the 
Supreme Court as an institution easing tensions and solving problems, but in 1857 
the Justices, bound by their own opinions and by undemocratic history of U.S. con-
stitutionalism, decided to go the other way. History showed how wrong that decision 
occurred to be.
THE EqUAL PROTECTION OF LAW?
The civil war, which broke out as a result of longstanding conflict between social, eco-
nomic and political approach to life of the Northern and Southern states, proved dev-
astating for both sides of the conflict, showing the lack of unity of the United States of 
America. One of the major problems confronted by the winning side, the Union, was 
the issue of slavery which divided the country so sharply. President Abraham Lincoln, 
due to political and military reasons28, became one of the strongest proponents of end-
ing the infamous tradition of slavery. His Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 freed all 
slaves under Confederate control who decided to escape to Northern states controlled 
by the Union. The next step to be taken was to amend the federal constitution which 
served as a background to all slave acts established since the beginning of American 
statehood. Despite the fact that Lincoln did not live to see the result of his initiative, 
most of contemporary African -Americans tend to name him the greatest President in 
the history of the United States29. Indeed, Lincoln’s efforts came into force in 1865, 
27 60 U.S. at 624 (1857).
28 There are voices that despite his enormous influence on equalization of African -Americans, Abraham 
Lincoln was not ideologically a proponent of banning slavery. As Philip Jenkins observes, in 1858 
Lincoln declared himself implacably opposed to the social and political equality of the white and black 
races. Four years later he explained himself, that his overreaching goal was to save the Union, and as 
he said: what I do about slavery and the colored race, I do it because it helps to save this union. P. Jenkins, 
A History of the United States, p. 134.
29 Such an approach was visible in the words of Martin Luther King, and also the current President of 
the United States, Barack Obama. See: B. Obama, The Audacity of Hope. Thoughts on Reclaiming the 
American Dream, New York 2006, pp. 97 -98.
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when the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, banning slavery 
in the whole country. As a result about four million people were freed, and were given 
opportunity to become the addressees of the Preamble’s words We the People of the 
United States for the first time. It is worth observing, that the Amendment automati-
cally abolished the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford30, but it did not 
end all of the legal and social problems of black members of American society. As a po-
litical group they still lacked basic rights such as suffrage or equality to the law, and as 
a social group they were treated like enemies by most of the former slaveholders from 
Southern states. Therefore, three years after banning the slavery, the Constitution 
was amended again, in order to solve various legal and social issues concerning the 
Reconstruction era, one of which was the necessity to establish the equal protection 
of law clause. The Fourteenth Amendment, directed mainly to the states, referred to 
the due process of law principle, broadening the necessity to protect life, liberty and 
property of U.S. citizens by the states. Among citizens, the Constitution included for 
the first time meant black Americans, whose rights could be asserted in front of U.S. 
courts. Ending the process of equalization of black Americans, the government en-
forced one more constitutional amendment which gave them suffrage rights in state 
and federal elections31.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not directly confront the slavery issues during the 
civil war or just at its aftermath. But the next decades opened the possibility to ad-
judicate in disputes which concerned the actual status of African -Americans in U.S. 
legal and social reality, thus interpreting the scope of protection afforded to them by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Slaughterhouse Cases, which concerned different is-
sues of monopoly in the slaughterhouse business, the Court took time to stress, that 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all 
the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons32. A few years later in 
Strauder v. West Virginia, a dispute regarding the guarantees of the jury service, the 
Justices declared laws permitting jury service of only white people as unconstitution-
al33. But these two cases were not the most important ones, as the general direction of 
the Supreme Court’s adjudication on African -American rights was totally different, 
and could be observed in two major disputes in the 1880’s and 1890’s. First of them, 
30 In general, Congress overruled Supreme Court’s precedents only four times in history, by creating 
constitutional amendments i.e. Eleventh Amendment in 1795 (Chisholm v. Georgia 2 U.S. 419, 1793), 
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 (Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. 393, 1857), Sixteenth Amendment 
in 1913 (Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429, 1895) and Twenty Sixth Amendment in 
1971 (Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112, 1970).
31 It is important to acknowledge that at this time the constitution meant black men, as women (of all 
races) gained suffrage rights yet in 1920 thanks to the constitutional amendment.
32 Slaughterhouse Cases: Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live -Stock 
Landing and Slaughterhouse Company, and Esteben, et al. v. Louisiana ex rel. Belden 83 U.S. 16 
(1873).
33 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Court’s reasoning in Strauder was affirmed more than 100 years later in 
Batson v. kentucky, where the Justices criticized racial discrimination in the process of selecting the 
jurors. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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called the Civil Rights Cases, consisted of five disputes concerning the constitution-
ality of the Civil Rights Act passed by Congress in 187534. The Act was one of the 
last pieces of congressional legislation during Reconstruction era designed to protect 
Southern black Americans from any infringements and violations, mainly in public 
facilities. But the Justices of the Supreme Court, led by Joseph Bradley, decided to rule 
the congressional act unconstitutional, as the federal government was not authorized 
to create legislation concerning the equality in public facilities. On the contrary, ac-
cording to the Justices, it was the states’ role to establish provisions in that respect, and 
therefore particular actions undertaken by the white people limiting rights of African-
-Americans were found consistent with the constitution35. As Peter Irons observes, 
Justice Bradley surprisingly easy found that the Thirteenth Amendment refers only 
to slaves, and slavery was no longer American problem, so its provisions could not be 
applied to the case. Furthermore, the Justice treated also the Fourteenth Amendment 
similarly, concluding that it did not provide any power to prohibit private discrimina-
tion which was at stake36. Again, one could cite a strong dissenting opinion written in 
the case by Justice John Marshall Harlan, but it would not change the overall feeling, 
that the Court, once again, decided to interpret the Constitution in a very narrow 
manner, allowing racial disparities to expand.
After creating three amendments to the Constitution in order to equalize the legal 
position of black Americans, it seemed that the legal basis for a major social change had 
been founded by the government, although in some southern states of the country lo-
cal governments and members of the society were reluctant to acknowledge this consti-
tutional protection of black citizens of the United States. To prevent the enforcement 
of the new amendments, especially concerning the suffrage rights and equal protection 
clause, many governments enacted legislation preventing equalization of the social sta-
tus of African -Americans. These provisions, called Jim Crow laws, established segrega-
tion in public facilities, such as transportation, schools, and public offices, but also pre-
vented black citizens from participating in elections by prohibiting illiterates to vote, 
which in reality concerned mainly former slaves and their families. The U.S. Supreme 
Court did not have many opportunities to review the Jim Crow laws in accordance 
with the Constitution, but such a situation occurred at the end of the 19th century in 
Plessy v. Ferguson37. Homer Plessy, a person who was only one -eighth black, took the 
train in Louisiana and violated the law which prohibited him to sit in the area designed 
for white people. When he refused to move to the part of the car intended for black 
people, he was arrested on the basis of the state law which imposed such segregation in 
34 The names of the cases consolidated in the description Civil Rights Cases were: United States v. Stanley, 
United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols, United States v. Singleton, Robinson et. ux. v. Memphis & 
Charleston R.R. Co.
35 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
36 P. Irons, A People’s History…, pp. 212 -215.
37 P. Laidler, Basic Cases in U.S. Constitutional Law, vol. 2: Rights and Liberties, Cracow 2009, p. 121. To 
read more about Jim Crow laws see: J.M. Packard, American Nightmare. The History of Jim Crow, New 
York 2003.
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the public transportation system. When his case reached the highest judicial authority 
in the country, most African -Americans were looking with hope towards the Justices. 
Seven of them, however, decided to interpret the Constitution narrowly, affirming 
equality among races, but supporting at the same time the Louisiana law. The doctrine 
established in the case was called separate -but -equal and meant, in practice, the govern-
ment’s consent for state -based segregation. As Justice Brown stressed, the Court con-
sidered the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff ’s argument to consist in the assumption that 
the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. 
If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored 
race chooses to put that construction upon it38. For those who analyzed former behavior 
of the Court in similar situations, the outcome of the decision was not a big surprise – 
the majority of the Justices affirmed their inability to treat African -Americans equally 
with white people. If there is any light in the tunnel of the dark side of Plessy ruling it 
is, according to Cheryl Harris, the dissent of Justice John Marshall Harlan, who con-
demned state -compelled segregation as a system of racial caste inconsistent with the 
Constitution. In this respect, Harris argues, the decision represents both an egregious 
endorsement of racial oppression, as well as the promise of rectification as prefigured 
in Justice Harlan’s dissent39. Similar arguments were raised by the Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, who commented on the case almost a hundred year later: The Court blandly 
overlooked the pronouncement of 120 -years earlier in the “Declaration of Independence” 
that “All Men are created equal” […] and gave a cramped reading to the provisions of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. […] But the opinion in Plessy had one merit 
that could not be found in the Dred Scott case. It was the ringing and eloquent dissent 
of one Justice, John Marshall Harlan40. In reality, both sides showed consistence with 
former rulings – the majority of the Court upheld the discriminatory direction of its 
adjudication, the minority (represented often alone by Harlan) condemned majority’s 
argumentation, thus opposing the Jim Crow laws. The result was highly controversial: 
for the next decades the separate -but -equal doctrine prevailed over the equal protec-
tion clause of the Constitution thus continuing the undemocratic character of the U.S. 
legal system.
Many scholars prefer to move from Plessy directly to Brown v. Board of Education, 
which overruled the separate -but -equal doctrine. Not neglecting the obvious logic of 
such analysis, it is still worth to observe the Court’s decision -making process between 
1896 and 1954 when Brown was decided. The mentioned period may show the atti-
tude of the Justices toward the scope of African -American rights and liberties, especial-
ly with regard to death penalty and voting rights. The cases at stake were decided in the 
late 1930s and in 1940s, what proves that there were more important issues necessary 
to cover by the Justices, such as federal -state relations, economic reforms, or broaden-
38 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39 C.I. Harris, ‘The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson. The Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism’ in 
M.C. Dorf (ed.), Constitutional Law Stories, p. 182.
40 W.E. Burger, It Is So Ordered. A Constitution Unfolds, New York 1995, p. 131.
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ing the scope of due process of law on states41. But at the same time one could observe 
implementation of the separate -but -equal doctrine in the lower courts’ cases, most of 
which never reached the highest judicial tribunal in the United States. The disputes 
concerned especially the rights of the black accused in criminal trials, who were very 
often deprived of their fundamental liberties, including life, because of their skin color. 
Death penalty in the United States had its greatest time ever: in 1930s there were more 
executions than in any other decade in American history, an average of 167 per year42. 
Statistically the majority of them was imposed on African -Americans what raised nu-
merous doubts and concerns about the arbitrariness of U.S. judiciary. According to 
Linda Monk, jurors did not treat like cases alike, and if they followed a pattern, it was 
based on race. African -Americans were sentenced to death far more often than whites, and 
defendants executed for rape were virtually always black men charged with attacking white 
women43. One of such disputes reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which needed to de-
cide upon the constitutionality of repeated execution of an African -American with re-
gard to the meaning of the double jeopardy clause. In Louisiana v. Resweber, a 16 -year 
old African -American was sentenced to death and during his execution the electric 
current passed through his body was insufficient to kill him, therefore he appealed in 
order to avoid the second attempt of electrocution. In a narrow -margin decision, the 
Court upheld Resweber’s sentence and, despite many concerns about his guilt, ordered 
second attempt to execute him44. The precedent was significant for the development 
of U.S. constitutional law, as it made the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 
Eighth Amendment applicable to the states, but it was also significant for the African-
-Americans who felt again that the equal protection clause did not always work, as it 
should.
Not only rights of the accused but also voting rights became an area of fight of 
African -Americans for more guarantees, particularly if one considers that since 1920 
also black women entered the voting American family. Unfortunately for African-
-Americans the law in the United States was not unified, and legal provisions in various 
states were different, limiting often voting rights of the black part of the community. 
Instead of applying the process of unification of the law, the Supreme Court continued 
to accept the policy of segregation imposed by some of the states or political groups. The 
41 This period of constitutional history is called dual federalism, as the Court confronted mainly the is-
sues of federal and state laws which contradicted, deciding cases concerning the scope of governmental 
intrusion in state and local matters. See for example: Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Since 
the 1920’s the issues of freedom of speech and of religion became crucial, as the Justices expanded the 
provisions of Bill of Rights on states. See for example: Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Near 
v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931) or Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 (1937). But the most problems 
occurred in the 1930s with the constitutionality of FDR’s New Deal program. See for example: West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1935) or A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States 295 U.S. 495 
(1935).
42 For more on that topic see: R. Bohm, Deathquest. An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital 
Punishment in the United States, Cincinnati 1999.
43 L.R. Monk, The Words We Live By…, p. 185.
44 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
262 POLITEJA 1(23)/2013Paweł Laidler
latter situation could be observed in Grovey v. Townsend, where the Court confronted 
the problem of whites -only restriction during the Democratic primary elections held 
at the convention of Texas Democratic Party. An African -American, R. Grovey, was 
not allowed a ballot in the elections and he took the case to court, finally appealing to 
the highest judicial instance. The Justices confirmed the constitutionality of the Party’s 
restrictions, as it was a voluntary political association […] having the power to determine 
who shall be eligible for membership45. From the legal perspective the case followed the 
long range of decisions differing state action from private action, but from the social 
perspective it proved an ongoing willingness of many environments of white people 
to uphold the practical aspects of racial segregation. Also in another case concerning 
racial discrimination, Shelley v. kraemer, the Court confirmed that racially restrictive 
agreements did not violate the Constitution, although if the states wanted to enforce 
them, then such violation would occur46. Not only the Justices’ opinion seems contro-
versial, but the facts of the case alone stand as an example of social tensions characteris-
tic for this period of U.S. history. The Kraemers were a white couple who owned a resi-
dence governed by an agreement preventing African -Americans from owning property 
in their neighborhood. The picture is clear: in the wake of 1950s there was a society 
partly benefiting from the “separate -but -equal” doctrine, there was a government fo-
cusing on effects of the world war, as well as economic and political issues of the day 
excluding the racial segregation, and there was a Supreme Court which was directly 
responsible for the undemocratic interpretation of the constitutional equal protection 
of law clause. How is it possible to achieve any change in the way of shaping social rela-
tions within a divided country? You need activism of some social groups and you need 
activism of some of the Justices…
THE MILESTONE CASE – THE REAL REASONING
The change in Court’s interpretation of the Constitution with respect to rights of 
African -Americans took place in the mid -1950s. But it would be a misunderstanding 
to assume, that the Brown v. Board of Education decision stands alone as a milestone 
in the process of equalization of the black community in America. Such slow changes 
could be visible a few years earlier, and there are some cases which clearly reveal the evo-
lution of the Justices’ approach towards more democratic readings of the supreme law 
of the land. Among them, the most crucial seem to be: Smith v. Allwright, Beuharnais 
v. Illinois, and Sweatt v. Painter.47 In Smith, which facts were similar to the ones from
Grovey v. Townsend, one could observe the process of overruling former infamous deci-
sion by the Court, which declared the Party restrictions against black Americans in vot-
ing procedures unconstitutional. As Justice Stanley Reed noted, the Court could not
45 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
46 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47 321 U.S. 649 (1944), 343 U.S. 250 (1952) and 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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allow racial discrimination in elections conducted by a private organization48. Different 
issues were presented in the Beuharnais case, as it concerned the distribution of leaflets 
exhorting to stop the harassment of white people by the black people (called in the le-
aflet Negroes). The question confronted by the Court regarded the constitutionality of 
Beuharnais’ behavior under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. In the ma-
jority opinion presented by Justice Felix Frankfurter, five members of the Court reject-
ed to apply First Amendment’s protection, because the leaflets were provocative and 
Beauharnais was convicted of violating the Illinois law, which prohibited distribution 
of any racially discriminating publications49. It is necessary to observe, that at the time 
the Court rarely limited the free speech clause on the basis of racial discrimination, 
therefore the outcome of the case marked a change in constitutional interpretation of 
the rights of African -Americans. Similar, but even far more reaching effect was achiev-
ed thanks to the decision made by the Supreme Court in Sweatt v. Painter. A black 
American, Herman Sweatt, applied for admission to the Texas University Law School, 
but he was not accepted on the grounds of race. The University tried to provide a spe-
cial number of seats for black people on the grounds of the separate -but -equal doctrine, 
but Sweatt took his case to the court. In 1950 the U.S. Supreme Court heard the dispu-
te on appeal and found University’s action unconstitutional as it violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the Justices, segregation in 
the University would harm African -Americans not allowing them to compete or col-
laborate with white students50. What seems interesting, identical decision was reached 
by the Court with regard to University of Oklahoma in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, which allowed the anti -discrimination organizations (with N.A.A.C.P. in the 
front row) to announce the end of the separate -but -equal doctrine51. Despite both sur-
prising verdicts, the final rulings did not address the problem of segregation in general, 
but only applied to the functioning of particular Universities. Although the Justices 
had the possibility to overrule the infamous Plessy decision, they preferred to take small 
steps in the process of ending the racial discrimination.
The milestone step which helped to establish formal legal equality among races in 
American society was taken by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka. Since the Plessy precedent black children could not attend schools for white 
children due to regulations forming segregation in public facilities. Linda Brown was 
an African -American attending a segregated black school a few miles from her house 
in Topeka, while there was a school for white children located just a few blocks from 
where she lived. Her parents challenged the Kansas law, as it established segregation 
which led to inequalities among children of different racial descent. They filed a suit 
against the Board of Education of Topeka, which approved of the program and had 
48 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
49 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
50 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
51 In McLaurin the Justices found the segregation of black students in University classrooms, libraries 
and cafeterias unconstitutional. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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operated it since 1879. The lower courts upheld the law, using as a justification the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy. However, the Justices on appeal revised the old 
precedent, overruling it and thus ending with the separate -but -equal doctrine52. The 
case in question showed sharp divisions between the Justices of the Court, and it was 
Chief Justice’s Earl Warren’s role to convince all members of the Court to achieve 
a proper and unanimous verdict. He was aware of that fact admitting that he could not 
escape the feeling that no matter how much the Court wanted to avoid the issue, it had to 
face it. Justice Warren stressed, that the Court had finally arrived at the place where it 
had to determine whether segregation was allowable in public schools53. In 1954, speak-
ing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice stated that any kind of separation led to 
inequality which was forbidden by U.S. Constitution. He proved that segregation proc-
ess impaired the motivation of black children to learn and that separate educational 
facilities were inherently unequal. Justices abolished the infamous separate -but -equal 
doctrine created 58 years earlier, because it meant inequality for minorities, especially 
in such socially delicate area of public education54. As a result, particular states had to 
resign from enacting laws that promoted any kind of racial separation and segregation, 
what proved a very complicated process. For example, to ensure that the Court’s deci-
sion would come into effect, President Dwight Eisenhower (not fully convinced about 
that) ordered federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, so that black children could en-
ter the school. On that day, the President addressed the nation and explained that his 
duty to uphold the ruling of the Supreme Court was “inescapable”55. Notwithstanding 
the above mentioned example, the language used by the Court in Brown was not so op-
timistic, as many may think. Segal, Spaeth and Benesh notice, that the Court ordered 
desegregation, not integration, despite giving local federal district courts full responsi-
bility to apply “all -deliberate -speed” mandate. But in reality, for the next fifteen years 
the Justices ducked school desegregation before ruling that schools were to be immedi-
ately desegregated56.
It is worth mentioning that there were also other reasons than U.S. legal principles 
which counted in the final verdict of the Court. According to the U.S. government’s 
brief addressed to the Justices of the Court, the existence of discrimination against minor-
ity groups in the United States has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. 
Racial discrimination […] raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity 
of our devotion to the democratic faith57. There is no doubt that one of the real reasons 
52 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53 From Warren’s Brown conference. See: B. Schwartz, The History of the Supreme Court, New York 
1993, pp. 291 -295. For more on Warren and Brown see: M.R. Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl 
Warren, 1953 -1969, Columbia 2005.
54 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55 C.J. Pach, E. Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lawrence 1991, p. 153.
56 J.A Segal, H.J. Spaeth, S.C. Benesh, The Supreme Court in the American Legal System, New York 
2005, p. 60. It is important to acknowledge that the quote all -deliberate -speed comes from Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Brown II (349 U.S. 294, 1955).
57 Amicus brief for the United States in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).
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for the necessity to change the segregation laws in the United States was the Cold War 
period, during which there was not only an open conflict between the U.S. and Soviet 
Union, but also a strong public relations movement in both states (various diplomat-
ic and propaganda actions) aimed at achieving a better international position. The 
American government felt that its position in Europe may be weaker because of racial 
inequalities that occurred in a state which called itself a model democracy58. Therefore, 
the Court was not only bound by particular provisions of the Constitution but also by 
tremendous pressure from the U.S. government. It does not change the general impact 
the case had on social relations in the United States, despite the fact it needed a lot 
more time to come in force, than most of the Justices thought it would in 1954.
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL?
In 1979 a new movie by Norman Jewison was presented in U.S. cinemas under the ti-
tle …And Justice for All, starring young Al Pacino. The movie was a typical court drama 
telling a story about a young lawyer who began his career full of belief in justice and ju-
dicial bipartisanship. However, after some time he discovered that the legal world was 
not so ideal, and that justice did not work equally for all59. After watching the movie 
the feelings concerning the U.S. legal system are somewhat mixed, as one realizes that 
the system is not only legitimized by institutions preset to serve the community, but it 
is often dependent on the people who drive the system into particular direction. For 
more than 150 years the U.S. Supreme Court has driven American constitutional law 
into the direction of controversies and ambiguities, especially with regard to the treat-
ment of African -Americans. After their decision in Brown, the Justices marked a signi-
ficant change in their attitude, but by saying A they forced themselves to say B. Such an 
opportunity occurred after imposition of new federal laws regarding the unification of 
civil rights and voting rights in the United States. In 1964 Congress passed The Civil 
Rights Act prohibiting inter alia race discrimination in places of public accommodation 
and a year later The Voting Rights Act aimed at banning discrimination in election pro-
cedures60. Soon after these laws came into force their constitutionality was confronted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of cases, some of which need brief analysis.
The same year when the Civil Rights Act was adopted by Congress, the Court 
adjudicated in two disputes concerning its constitutionality, Heart of Atlanta Motel 
v. United States and katzenbach v. McClung. In the first case, the owners of a motel in
Georgia were charged with violating the Act by not allowing African -Americans to use
their services. During the litigation in front of the Supreme Court, they argued that
Congress had no power over local motels and could not established federal laws enforc-
58 For more on this topic see: M.L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights. Race and the Image of American 
Democracy, Princeton 2000.
59 …And Justice For All, directed by N. Jewison, 1979.
60 P. Jenkins, A History of the United States, p. 265. See: Publ. Law 89 -110 (1965).
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ing them to serve particular social groups. But the Justices had a different opinion and 
confirmed constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act on the basis of the commerce clause 
of Article One, thus allowing Congress to regulate interstate commerce, to which op-
eration of motels near state highways applied61. Despite of legal aspects of the case, it 
is worth observing, that the majority opinion referred to the necessity of protection of 
racial minorities against discrimination, thus broadening the scope of the equal protec-
tion clause. In another case decided a few weeks later the facts were similar: owners of 
a restaurant in Alabama refused to serve black Americans, and they were found guilty 
of violating the Civil Rights Act. The katzenbach v. McClung case was brought to the 
Supreme Court on appeal and was determined in the same way as the Georgia dispute. 
Justices opposed to the discrimination in restaurants and acknowledged Congress’ abil-
ity to control the movement of products of interstate commerce62. Both cases may serve 
as an example of the increase of the federal powers over traditional state issues, but are 
often presented as the Court’s final word on desegregation policy of the government.
In the 1960s there have been more disputes concerning racial discrimination and the 
scope of the equal protection clause, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Edwards 
v. South Carolina the Justices determined the constitutionality of arresting by state po-
lice several African -Americans peacefully marching and protesting against the state’s pol-
icy of segregation. As their actions were not violent, the Court had no problem with stat-
ing, that their arrest and convictions were unlawful and violated the First Amendment’s
free speech and free assembly clauses63. Today such a verdict would be obvious for re-
searches analyzing Court’s adjudication in free speech matters, but in the early 1960s it
sounded revolutionary, as the social group at stake was rarely protected before. Similar
conclusions may be reached after analyzing Brown v. Louisiana concerning a peaceful
sit -in protest by an African -American in a public library64. This new standard set by
the Justices was, on one hand, the result of their argumentation in Brown v. Board of
Education, but on the other, a proof that there were more clauses in the Constitution
than only the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, which could be used to
ban racial discrimination of any form. Four years later the Court used not only the equal
protection argument, but also the right to privacy principles to justify inter -racial mar-
riage. A black woman, Mildred Jeter, married a white man, Richard Loving, what was
prohibited under Virginia law. As a result they were charged, found guilty and sentenced
to imprisonment, but on appeal the case was brought to the highest judicial instance in
the United States. The Court in Loving v. Virginia acknowledged that the state law was
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment and thus had no legitimate purpose65.
As a result, Lovings were acquitted, and their case serves as one of the fundamental ex-
amples of judicial protection of the right to privacy. The same way as black Americans
61 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
62 379 U.S. 279 (1964).
63 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
64 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
65 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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began to function normally in public facilities, they also regained proper treatment in 
private sphere. In Jones v. Mayer, a black man sued a company which refused to sell him 
a house in an area destined only for white people. The Supreme Court not only no-
ticed that the company’s action violated federal law aimed at protecting racial groups 
from discrimination, but it also stressed that imposition of racial barriers in property law 
backed the country to the times of slavery66. Such an argument was used for the first time 
since Civil Rights Cases of 1883, and reveals the growing reluctance of the Justices of the 
late 1960s towards the controversial and undemocratic past.
While the 1960s were used by the Supreme Court to end the process of racial seg-
regation in public and private facilities, the 1970s produced quite a revolutionary ap-
proach towards the interpretation of the equal protection clause. Suddenly the U.S. 
government realized that more than 150 years of suffering of racial minorities should 
be justified in a more significant manner than only by approving desegregation. Since 
the late 1970s various programs called affirmative action had been established in order 
to make a classification designed to aid members of racial minorities. As time showed 
there were two basic forms of affirmative action: either setting quotas to reserve a spe-
cific number of places for minority members and a specific number for nonminori-
ty members, or setting separate standards by giving preferential treatment to minority 
members without the use of quotas67. Soon, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of 
affirmative action, as it entered universities and schools across the United States, rais-
ing many controversies to its constitutionality. One of the most famous cases in which 
the status of affirmative action was determined, Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke, took place in 1978. A white man, Allan Bakke, applied for admission to the
Medical School, but he did not succeed as the University set quotas for racial minori-
ties. Their affirmative action program reserved 15% of 100 seats for the representatives
of racial minorities, and due to that Bakke could not be admitted, although he received
the better score than black Americans who were admitted. The result of Court’s ad-
judication was ambiguous and somewhat surprising, as there was no single majority
opinion. Four of the Justices stated that any form of government -based racial quotas
was forbidden, whereas the other four upheld constitutionality of the School’s admis-
sion program arguing that affirmative action programs should not be put under judi-
cial scrutiny. The decisive vote was cast by Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., who on one hand
criticized the program as being too rigid and forcing the University to admit Bakke,
but on the other suggesting that less rigid quotas would be found constitutional in fu-
ture68. According to Keith Whittington, Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke became the
road map for many institutions designing affirmative action programs, but subsequent
Burger Court cases… did little to clarify the legal status of affirmative action69. Such
66 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
67 J.E. Nowak, R.D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, St. Paul 2000, pp. 736 -740.
68 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
69 K.E. Whittington, ‘The Burger Court (1969 -1986). Once More in Transition’ in C. Tomlins (ed.), 
The United States Supreme Court…, p. 314.
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clarification came in Court’s 2003 opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, where a white wom-
an was denied admission to Law School in Michigan because of the existence of racial 
factor in the admission procedures. The Supreme Court, in a narrow -margin decision, 
supported the Law School’s program, because race was only one of many admission cri-
teria, and it served to achieve educational benefits by producing more diverse student 
body70. From the perspective of Grutter, it seems obvious that the recent direction of 
the Court’s decision -making process in the area of equal protection of law aims at com-
pensating the tragic history of inequality of African -Americans. Paradoxically, the form 
in which the Justices want to achieve their goal seems also undemocratic, but now the 
subject of the discrimination has changed. How in this light should one confront the 
title of Norman Jewison’s movie …And Justice For All?
The problem is that the Court itself is sharply divided over the issues of affirmative 
action and the form of redressing the balance in U.S. constitutional law. The Justices are 
arguing about the scope of the equal protection clause, and about constitutionality of 
certain acts of government aiming at the process of social equalization. Furthermore, 
not all of the decisions undertaken by the Supreme Court since the late 1960s are favo-
rable for African -Americans. The cases of Washington v. Davis and McCleskey v. kemp 
may serve as good examples in that respect. In the first dispute, two black men brought 
action against the D.C. Police Department, claiming that the recruitment proce-
dures were discriminatory and violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court, however, upheld constitutionality of these procedures, stat-
ing that they did not constitute any official discrimination based on race, as well as they 
did not have any discriminatory intent71. In McCleskey a black man was convicted and 
sentenced to death, but he appealed stating that the main reason of his sentence was 
race, as statistically blacks were given the capital punishment more often that represent-
atives of other races in the state of Georgia. The Supreme Court rejected McCleskey’s 
arguments, because he did not prove unlawful character of his death verdict, and statis-
tics could not be treated as a binding evidence of someone’s guilt or innocence72. The 
two above -mentioned decisions do not change the general attitude of American law 
repairing the weakened condition of the words democracy and rule of law. The U.S. 
Supreme Court is the main actor shaping the current understanding of particular con-
stitutional provisions concerning equality and freedom, trying to provide the impossi-
ble: justice for everybody at the same time.
CONCLUSIONS
A careful analysis of the numerous cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning 
the constitutional status of black Americans reveals two patterns in judicial operation: 
70 The case was decided along with Gratz v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
71 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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continuity and change. Continuity of racial approach may be observed since the very be-
ginning of the process of constitutional interpretation when the majority of Justices silent-
ly or openly affirmed slavery (Dred Scott), but even after abolishing it by the American 
government they found ways to uphold laws establishing racial discrimination (Plessy) or 
abolish acts promoting equality (Civil Rights Cases), with rare exceptions (Slaughterhouse, 
Strauder). The significant change took place in the 1950s and 1960s, when interior pres-
sures, social tensions and political situation (also from international perspective) forced 
the Court to abandon old and infamous principles and to initiate a difficult process of 
desegregation (Brown v. Board of Education). The continuity of the approach towards de-
segregation could be observed on one hand in decisions limiting discrimination based on 
race in public and private facilities (katzenbach, Heart of Atlanta Motel), and on the other 
in verdicts upholding governmental programs aimed at compensating African -Americans 
more than 150 years of inequality (Grutter). Today the Supreme Court is divided so as to 
the scope of the equal protection clause interpretation but the differences are slight com-
pared to those occurring more than hundred years ago (Harlan v. the rest of the crew in 
Plessy). Nevertheless the best way to describe contemporary approach of the Justices is the 
word: uncertainty (or ambiguity). The narrow -margin verdicts reached in a few recent 
cases shows ambiguous future for the equal protection cases.
My research did not present all of the cases decided in racial matters by the Supreme 
Court, but definitely the most important disputes which marked their significance 
in the history of U.S. constitutional law, as well as on social relations in the country. 
Analysis of these cases resulted in creating a chart presenting the changing approach of 
the highest judicial tribunal in the United States towards African -Americans:
YEAR CASE NAME DECISION PATTERN
1842 Prigg v. Pennsylvania silent consent to slavery RACISM
1847 Jones v. VanZandt silent consent to slavery continuity
1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford slavery constitutional continuity
1873 Slaughterhouse Cases theoretical protection of racial inequality slight change
1880 Strauder v. West Virginia only -white juries unconstitutional slight change
1883 Civil Rights Cases Civil Rights Act in part unconstitutional continuity
1896 Plessy v. Fergusson separate -but -equal doctrine continuity
1935 Grovey v. Townsend group discrimination affirmed continuity
1944 Smith v. Allwright Grovey overruled slight change
1947 Louisiana v. Resweber second attempt to execute a black co-nvict legal continuity
1948 Shelley v. Kraemer racially restrictive agreements constitutional continuity
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YEAR CASE NAME DECISION PATTERN




1950 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
university -based segregation 
unconstitutional continuity
1952 Beuharnais v. Illinois equal protection prevails over freedom of speech continuity





1963 Edwards v. South Carolina
peaceful protest of black people 
constitutional continuity
1964 Heart of Atlanta Motel  v. United States
segregation in interstate motels 
unconstitutional continuity
1964 Katzenbach v. McClung segregation in interstate restaurants unconstitutional continuity
1966 Brown v. Louisiana peaceful protest of black people constitutional continuity
1967 Loving v. Virginia interracial marriages constitutional continuity
1968 Jones v. Mayer racial -based sale of property unconstitutional continuity
1976 Washington v. Davis recruitment constitutional if it lacks offi-cial discriminatory character uncertainty
1978 University of California v. Bakke
rigid quotas unconstitutional, affirmative 
action constitutional uncertainty
1986 Batson v. Kentucky end of racial discrimination in jury selec-tion process
continuity 
(EQUALITY)
1987 McCleskey v. Kemp statistical data do not influence death sentence of an African -American uncertainty
2003 Grutter v. Bollinger affirmative action constitutional uncertainty
It is difficult to avoid a conclusion, that the most of the Justices easily adapted to 
the times there were adjudicating. In the period of deep slavery, they confirmed the lack 
of any constitutional protection afforded to black Americans, and in most crucial mo-
ments of history they even went further by sanctioning slavery and influencing more 
controversies than ever. If one admits that in 1857 the Court did not have a choice to 
make a different judgment, it is necessary to carefully analyze Taney’s opinion which 
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could definitely lack the references to constitutional character of slavery. Even the fact 
that most of the Justices were racists does not justify the decision of the highest judi-
cial tribunal in the country responsible for just interpretation of the supreme law of the 
land. Only the arguments of original intent to which the Dred Scott opinion in part 
refers may serve as a partial justification of the cruelty of Court’s decision, but was it re-
ally necessary to go back to the intent of Founding Fathers seventy years after the adop-
tion of the constitution? Probably not. Similarly, after civil war, the Justices decided to 
shape the scope of newly created equal protection of law clause in a very narrow man-
ner by limiting the governmental efforts to equalize the society, and establishing an 
absurd doctrine denying the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plessy prec-
edent could be considered even worse than the Dred Scott decision, as it did not appeal 
to any original intent of the constitution but created a totally new approach fitting in 
the expectations of former slaveholders and racists from the Southern states. What is 
important, the government had already established new standards for the treatment of 
African -Americans, but the majority of the Supreme Court decided to disregard the 
real purposes of adopting the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. How is it pos-
sible to provide equality establishing at the same time segregation?
There is no doubt that individual attitude of particular Justices marked a dark side 
of the Supreme Court’s history, despite the fact that there were exceptions to the proper 
understanding of equality among them ( Justice Harlan). Furthermore, if one realizes 
that the separate -but -equal doctrine had survived for more than fifty years, although 
there were practical chances to overrule this infamous approach, the picture becomes 
clear: the U.S. Supreme Court did not pass the exam from democracy from the per-
spective of equal protection of law. This general thought should not concern other 
aspects of Court’s adjudication of that time, such as the separation of powers or inter-
pretation of various constitutional clauses (commerce clause, contracts clause, neces-
sary and proper clause, and many more). But in the area of racial discrimination, the 
institution became the part of larger campaign aimed at promoting one social group 
over others. Yet 100 years after Dred Scott the Court grew up to the significant change; 
change which was affected by various reasons, from individual opinions of the Justices, 
to social and political reasons. Since 1950s one may observe the evolution of the high-
est judicial tribunal in the United States from an actor assisting the government to an 
actor playing the main role among the three branches of government. The racial issues, 
along with general approach towards rights and liberties of American people, such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, rights of the accused in criminal trials, and due 
process of law in general, became tools in Court’s hands on its way to achieve suprem-
acy in the country. If someone has the power to decide about the final meaning of the 
Constitution, he has the power to decide about the final meaning of the legal, social, 
economic, and political relations. As Justice Robert Jackson stressed once, the Supreme 
Court’s decisions were not final because they were infallible, but they were infallible 
because they were final73. In the Fall of 2011 the Court again shall confront the issue of 
73 Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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affirmative action, thus influencing the current status of state -based politics towards ra-
cial minorities in America. Fisher v. University of Texas may become another milestone 
case on the way of shaping the proper image of race by U.S. judiciary and thus by the 
American society74.
It is a pity, that most of the Justices sitting historically on the Court did not use the 
power of judicial review to end the artificial divisions within the society, but instead 
they used it to justify the separation of races. It is difficult to reject the feeling that today 
the United States of America still pay for these mistakes. This or the other way.
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